Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time

If a nuclear war between American and Soviet forces or the forces of their allies were to start, how would it end? This soberting analysis, one of the few published treatments of War termination, identifies the policies and strategic issues involved in the attempt to control and end a nuclear war should one ever start. The author presents both a comprehensive overview of the theory of war termination and a broad-based analysis of the specific aspects of the question. Throughout, the aim is to provide policymakers and students of military strategy with a tool for improved strategic war planning that emphasizes the importance of flexibility and durability rather than the current emphasis on damage infliction.

Cimbala begins by discussing the compelling reasons for studying war termination, among them the potential deterrent value of such study. He then introduced pertinent issues in the literature of war termination, including the notion of an agreed battle’, escalation control, intrawar deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. The bulk of the study is devoted to a detailed discussion of specific aspects of nuclear war determination. Ih his concluding chapter, Cimbala integrates these aspects into a coherrent theory of nuclear war termination and assesses the potential implications of strategic defenses for American nuclear deterrence strategies.

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and teaches at its Delaware County Campus, Media, Pa. He has contributed to the field of national security studies for many years and is the author of the recently published Rethinking Nuclear Strategy (1988) and Nuclear Strategy: Unfinished Business (Greenwood Press, 1988).